A report the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency commissioned in June 2022 concluded that U.S. telecommunications networks contained “major structural vulnerabilities” and could be compromised from anywhere in the world. CISA did not release it. The unclassified report stayed buried for four years, until a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit forced the agency to hand over a redacted copy — and its findings became public on Thursday.
The 111-page report, titled “U.S. Telecommunications Insecurity 2022,” described the state of the nation’s phone networks as a “perilous and untenable situation,” and warned that international interconnects could provide attackers with “trusted” access to U.S. networks. “The fact that U.S. national networks can be readily compromised from anywhere in the world is not yet widely understood,” the report states.
The report was produced for CISA by AdaptiveMobile Security, a unit of the Swedish cybersecurity company Enea AB, and Telecom Defense, a U.S.-based telecom cybersecurity company, according to Bloomberg News, which reviewed the document. Its findings were based on a review of up to 50 billion daily “telecom events,” and it concluded that the United States was the most targeted country in the world for cyber exploits aimed at telecom protocols such as SS7, the decades-old signaling system that routes communications between phone networks. In a single week in May 2022, the report identified 9,000 suspicious incidents across U.S. phone networks that it linked to several unnamed “malicious entities.”
SS7, first developed in the 1970s, has known weaknesses that can be exploited to spy on phone calls and text messages and to track people’s locations. According to the report, the U.S. is exposed in part because its many operators — including small rural carriers with varying levels of security — create more entry points for attackers. The report recounts apparent espionage cases on U.S. soil, including a March 2022 case in which an individual carrying a Cyprus-registered mobile device was singled out for surveillance while apparently in Indianapolis, and an April 2022 attempt to covertly acquire the locations of phones linked to three people in the United States.

Forced out by a lawsuit
The report might never have surfaced without litigation. The Electronic Privacy Information Center requested the report under FOIA in March 2024; the Department of Homeland Security denied the request that November, claiming every page was protected by deliberative process privilege. EPIC sued in June 2025. On Oct. 29, 2026, EPIC received a redacted version of the report, and it says it will continue to pursue the release of additional material. The redacted copy excludes dozens of company names and other details, including the report’s recommendations for the telecom industry.
“The government has seemingly spent more effort trying to keep this report from the public than trying to protect the public against these known risks,” said Jeramie Scott, director of EPIC’s surveillance oversight program, who accused the government of doing little to address the problems even as it “knows these vulnerabilities are actively being exploited by bad actors.”
Two years before Salt Typhoon
The report landed more than two years before the disclosures of Salt Typhoon, the Chinese state-linked campaign in which, U.S. officials have alleged, hackers targeted nine telecom companies — including Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile and Lumen — and stole telephone audio intercepts and a large tranche of call records. In a November 2024 joint statement, CISA and the FBI confirmed that the Chinese government had hacked multiple telecommunications companies to enable the theft of call records.
Two former U.S. officials familiar with the breaches told Bloomberg that the Salt Typhoon hackers used SS7 for some early reconnaissance efforts, but did not exploit it to gain access to U.S. telecommunications networks.
Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., whose staff was permitted to read the report at CISA’s office in the fall of 2023, had pressed for its release for years. “It is totally inexcusable that CISA stonewalled releasing this report for four years, while adversaries were spying on Americans,” Wyden said in a statement to Bloomberg this week. In an earlier statement, he said that had the report been public in 2022, “Congress would have had ample time to require mandatory cybersecurity standards for phone companies, in time to prevent the Salt Typhoon hacks.” Wyden previously placed a hold on a prior CISA director nominee over the agency’s refusal to disclose the report.
Kevin Briggs, the former senior CISA official who commissioned the report, said he repeatedly pushed inside the agency for it to be published and circulated among lawmakers, and that superiors blocked him, telling him release would hurt CISA’s relationship with the telecommunications industry. In May 2024, Briggs filed a whistleblower statement with the Federal Communications Commission warning of “numerous incidents of successful, unauthorized attempts to access the network user location data” of people in the United States — which he called just the “tip of the proverbial iceberg.”
CISA and the industry push back
CISA said it did not act to adopt the report’s recommendations because the report “makes technical claims without presenting the supporting information necessary to verify the claims.” In court, the agency argued the report contained privileged information and was exempt from disclosure. A CISA spokesperson declined to comment to Bloomberg, and the agency did not immediately respond to a request for comment from Reuters.
CTIA, the wireless industry’s trade group, said the report contains no new findings affecting U.S. network security. “SS7 is not used in the 4G or 5G networks that Americans rely on daily for connectivity,” the group said in a statement, adding that the vulnerability has already been addressed through best practices and investments in advanced wireless networks.
John Hughes, head of Enea’s network security unit, said the issues described in the report are “more relevant than ever.” “The uncomfortable reality is that weaknesses in telecom networks have been exploited for years,” Hughes said in an emailed statement. “Pretending otherwise doesn’t make networks safer.”

